

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter 1	OVERVIEW OF THE COLORADO MOTOR VEHICLE INSURANCE LAW	1
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§ 1.1	INTRODUCTION	1
§ 1.2	OVERVIEW OF THE FORMER NO-FAULT ACT	2
§ 1.3	THE CURRENT SYSTEM	4

Chapter 2	UNINSURED AND UNDERINSURED MOTORIST CLAIMS AND COVERAGE	5
------------------	--	---

§ 2.1	INTRODUCTION	14
§ 2.2	STATUTORY REQUIREMENT FOR INSURERS TO OFFER UM AND UIM COVERAGE	25
§ 2.3	STACKING OF COVERAGES	27
§ 2.3.1	—General Rule Under The Former Statute — Anti-Stacking Clauses Included In A Single Policy Covering More Than One Vehicle Or In Several Policies Issued By The Same Insurer Do Not Violate Public Policy	27
	a—UM coverage	27
	b—UIM coverage	28
	c—Unambiguous anti-stacking provision in UM/UIM coverage is not contrary to doctrine of reasonable expectations	31
§ 2.3.2	—Under The Former Statute, Unambiguous Anti-Stacking Clause Is Enforced As Written	32
	a—To determine whether ambiguity exists, policy must be examined as a whole	32
	b—Anti-stacking clauses were conspicuous and enforceable even though they were in General Provisions section of the policy; however, policy language did not preclude stacking of coverage by two affiliated companies	34
§ 2.3.3	—Under The Former Statute, Ambiguous Anti-Stacking Clause Is Construed Against Insurer	38

§ 2.3.4—Rules Under The Former Statute Regarding Stacking Of Limits To Determine Whether A Tortfeasor’s Vehicle Is Underinsured	40
a—Plaintiff was not entitled to stack policies issued to her and a relative to determine whether tortfeasor’s vehicle was underinsured	40
b—In determining whether tortfeasor’s vehicle is “underinsured,” separate policies issued to different, unrelated insureds, including claimant, both of which cover claimant, should be stacked, and the aggregated limits should be compared to the limits of the tortfeasor’s policies; tortfeasor’s vehicle is underinsured if stacked UIM limits exceed tortfeasor’s limits	41
§ 2.3.5—Under The Former Statute, “Other Insurance” And “Two Or More Cars Insured” Provisions Contained In UM/UIM Coverage Did Not Entirely Prohibit Stacking In Absence Of Explicit Anti-Stacking Endorsement In Policy	47
§ 2.3.6—Anti-Stacking Under The Current Statute	49
§ 2.4 CAUSATION ISSUES	50
§ 2.4.1—The Fact That Injuries Were Directly Caused By The Use Of A Firearm Does Not Necessarily Negate The Existence Of A Causal Connection Between The Insured’s Injuries And The Use Of An Uninsured Motor Vehicle	51
a—Assault with firearm made from moving vehicle . . .	51
b—Assault with firearm occurring after assailant exits his vehicle	53
§ 2.4.2—Whether Injuries Are “Caused By Accident” Must Be Viewed From Standpoint Of Insured	55
§ 2.4.3—Dog Attack, Which Occurred Away From Vehicle, Was Causally Unrelated To Use Or Operation Of Uninsured Vehicle	57
§ 2.4.4—Injuries Of Plaintiff, Who Was Assaulted When Uninsured Vehicle Stopped In Front Of His Car And Passenger In Uninsured Vehicle Got Out And Assaulted Plaintiff With A Wine Bottle, Arose Out Of Use Of Uninsured Vehicle, And Plaintiff Was Entitled To Uninsured Motorist Benefits	58

Table of Contents

§ 2.4.5—Injuries Sustained By Insured During Sexual Assault Which Occurred In Her Car Did Not Arise Out Of The Use Of Her Car, And Insurer Was Not Obligated To Provide UM Coverage 60

§ 2.5 WHO IS AN “INSURED” FOR PURPOSES OF UM/UIM COVERAGE? — WHAT IS AN “UNINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE”? 63

§ 2.5.1—Minor Child, Who Was Not A Resident Of Her Father’s Household, Was Not An Insured Entitled To UM Coverage Under Father’s Automobile Insurance 63

§ 2.5.2—Wife Of Owner Of Closely Held Corporation, Who Was Designated Driver Under Commercial Auto Policy, Was An “Insured” Entitled To UM Coverage, Even Though Policy Defined The Corporation As The Only Insured 64

§ 2.5.3—Owner And Officer Of Corporation, Who Was Injured While Riding A Bicycle For Personal Reasons, Was Not An “Insured” Entitled To UIM Coverage Under Automobile Policy Issued To Corporation 66

§ 2.5.4—Passenger, Including Resident Relative Of Named Insured, Who Is Injured While Riding In Vehicle Operated By An Excluded Driver, Is Not An “Insured” Entitled To UM Coverage 67

a—Passenger not “insured” entitled to UM benefits where vehicle operated by excluded driver 67

b—Denial of UM/UIM coverage proper where driver was excluded driver under policy 68

§ 2.5.5—Because Policy Provision Purporting To Limit UIM Coverage Was Ambiguous, Party Injured While Riding On A Motorcycle Was An “Insured” For Purposes Of UIM Coverage 70

§ 2.5.6—Adult Woman Who Witnessed Mother’s Death In Bus Crash Was Not An “Insured” For Purposes Of UIM Coverage Under Parents’ Auto Insurance Policy And Could Not Recover For Her Emotional Distress In Witnessing Death 71

§ 2.5.7—UM Statute Does Not Require Coverage For Injuries Or Death Sustained By Person Not Insured Under The Terms Of The Policy 72

§ 2.5.8—The Words “Lives With” Applicable To Policy Exclusion Negating UM Coverage For An Insured While Occupying A Non-Covered Vehicle Operated By A “Relative” Are Ambiguous	74
§ 2.5.9—UIM Statute Does Not Require UIM Coverage For Wrongful Death Of A Person Who Is Not An “Insured” Under The Claimant’s Policy	75
§ 2.5.10—Under A Commercial Motor Vehicle Policy, Insurer Cannot Limit UM/UIM Coverage To Persons Occupying A Certain Class Of Vehicles	76
§ 2.5.11—Employee Was Not An Insured Entitled To Recover UIM Benefits Under Commercial Auto Policy Where Only Persons Occupying “Covered Autos” Were Insured; Employer Had Failed To Add Newly Acquired Truck To Policy, And, Therefore, Truck Was Not A Covered Vehicle	77
§ 2.5.12—UM/UIM Coverage Must Apply To Class Of Persons At Least As Extensive As Class Of Persons Covered For Liability	81
§ 2.6 WHO IS AN “UNINSURED MOTORIST” FOR PURPOSES OF UM COVERAGE — HIT-AND-RUN ACCIDENTS	84
§ 2.6.1—Requirement Of Physical Contact Between Hit-And-Run Vehicle And Insured Vehicle Is An Impermissible Restriction Of Statutorily Required Coverage	84
§ 2.6.2—Driver Who Withholds Or Falsifies Information May Be Considered Hit-And-Run Motorist	85
§ 2.6.3—Motorist Who Has Liability Coverage, But Who Cannot Be Located For Service Of Process, Is Not An Uninsured Motorist	86
§ 2.6.4—Where Tortfeasor’s Insurer Becomes Insolvent After Accident, Such Vehicle Is Considered An “Uninsured Motor Vehicle”	87
§ 2.6.5—Vehicle Covered Under Liability Provisions Of A Policy Is Not Uninsured Motor Vehicle For Purposes Of UM Coverage	89
§ 2.6.6—Liability Insurer’s Denial Of Coverage Based Upon Policy Exclusion Makes Vehicle “Uninsured” For Purposes Of UM Coverage	90

Table of Contents

§ 2.6.7—An Uninsured Snowmobile, While Being Operated Off Of Public Roads, Is Not Considered An “Uninsured Motor Vehicle” For Purposes Of UM Coverage 92

§ 2.6.8—Exclusion May Preclude Recovery Of UIM Benefits Where Insured Receives Compensation Up To UM/UIM Policy Limit From Other UM/UIM Carrier 93

§ 2.6.9—Exclusions For Motorcyclists And “Owned But Uninsured” Vehicles In UM/UIM Coverage Are Unenforceable, Since Such Exclusions Conflict With The Requirement Of The UM/UIM Statute For Insurers To Provide Coverage For Insured Persons Who Are Legally Entitled To Recover Damages From Owners Or Operators Of Uninsured Motor Vehicles 95

§ 2.6.10—Is An Insured Entitled To Recover UM Benefits Where The Tortfeasor Is Immune From Liability? 98

 a—Insured is entitled to recover UM benefits where the tortfeasor is immune from liability under the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act 98

 b—Where insured was injured by co-worker who was immune from liability under the Workers’ Compensation Act, insured was not entitled to recover UM benefits from the insurer of the tortfeasor’s employer 100

§ 2.6.11—Tortfeasor’s Failure To Cooperate With Liability Insurer, Which Resulted In A Denial Of Coverage, Made Tortfeasor’s Vehicle Uninsured, Permitting Victim Of Accident To Recover Uninsured Motorist Benefits 102

§ 2.7 UM COVERAGE FOR DERIVATIVE CLAIMS 103

 § 2.7.1—Loss Of Consortium Is Not “Bodily Injury” 103

 § 2.7.2—Parent’s UM Claim For Medical Expenses Incurred By Minor Child Is A Derivative Claim Subject To The Per Person Policy Limit For Bodily Injury 104

 § 2.7.3—Policy Provision Aggregating Loss Of Consortium Claim With Bodily Injury Claim And Subjecting Both To A Single Policy Limit Does Not Violate Public Policy 106

§ 2.7.4—Claims For Damages For Emotional Distress Caused By Witnessing Injury To Another Person Are Not Derivative Claims. However, Under The UM/UIM Statute, C.R.S. § 10-4-609, Emotional Distress Alone, Without Manifestation Of Physical Injury, Is Not A Bodily Injury, Sickness, Or Disease, And Is Not Covered	107
§ 2.8 RESOLUTION OF UM/UIM CLAIMS — ISSUES INVOLVING ARBITRATION AND LITIGATION	109
§ 2.8.1—Arbitration Clause In UM/UIM Coverage Is Not Invalid As Contrary To Public Policy	109
§ 2.8.2—Costs Of Arbitration To Be Borne By Insurer	111
§ 2.8.3—Default Judgment Obtained By Insured Against Tortfeasor May Be Binding Upon Insurer	112
a—“Consent to sue” clause in uninsured motorist coverage is void — Insurer has right to intervene in action brought by insured against uninsured motorist	112
b—Arbitration clause in uninsured motorist coverage is valid and enforceable, but “consent to sue” clause is void as against public policy — Insurer may waive right to arbitration	114
§ 2.8.4—By Failing To Object To Arbitration Award Within 30 Days, Insurer May Waive Defense That Arbitration Award Exceeded The Policy Limit	117
§ 2.8.5—Vacating Arbitration Award Due To Misconduct Of Arbitrator — Duty Of Arbitrator To Disclose Existence Of Substantial Business Relationship With Party Selecting Her	119
§ 2.8.6—Duty Of Insurer To Maintain Confidentiality Of Medical And Psychiatric Information Disclosed By Insured During Arbitration Proceeding	121
§ 2.8.7—Award Or Judgment In Excess Of Policy Limit — Liability Of Insurer For Prejudgment Interest In Excess Of Policy Limit	122
a—Trial court may vacate arbitration award in excess of policy limits — Insurer generally not liable for prejudgment interest in excess of policy limits	122
b—UM carrier is not liable to pay prejudgment interest in excess of the policy limits	124

Table of Contents

c—Where arbitration provision authorized arbitrator to determine “amount of payment” under the policy, and insurer did not raise policy limits or setoffs as affirmative defenses, arbitrator did not exceed authority by awarding insured more than the policy limit 126

d—Where UIM arbitration agreement provided that only issue arbitrator was to decide was the amount of damages to which claimant was entitled, arbitrator had no authority to reduce arbitration award by applying policy limit and giving insurer offset for amount paid by tortfeasor 128

e—Trial court had no authority to modify arbitration award to add prejudgment and post-judgment interest and to award costs to insured where the parties had not reserved these issues for review by the court 131

§ 2.8.8—Application Of Collateral Estoppel To Arbitration Proceeding — Trial Court’s Ruling That Underinsured Motorist Was Not Liable For Causing Injuries Precludes Insured From Re-Litigating The Issue In Arbitration 132

§ 2.8.9—Right To Jury Trial 133

a—Where insurer intervenes, or is joined as a defendant, in action brought by insured against uninsured motorist and the uninsured motorist defaults, insurer has no right to a jury trial with respect to issues of liability and damages raised in the tort litigation between the insured and the uninsured motorist 133

b—Subrogation action brought by insurer against underinsured motorist to recover benefits paid to insured for damages caused by the underinsured motorist was based upon legal, not equitable, claims. Therefore, in defending against such claims, underinsured motorist was entitled to a jury trial 140

§ 2.8.10—Absent Express Disclaimer Of Particular Terms And Conditions, Excess Insurer’s Follow-Form Endorsement Tracks Underlying Coverage In Every Respect, Including Arbitration Clause In Underlying Coverage 141

§ 2.9	EFFECT OF RELEASE OF UNINSURED MOTORIST ON INSURER’S LIABILITY — RELEASE EXECUTED BY INSURED IN FAVOR OF UNINSURED MOTORIST BARRED UM CLAIM BY INSURED AGAINST INSURER	144
§ 2.10	LIABILITY OF INSURER FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND PREJUDGMENT INTEREST ON DAMAGES	146
§ 2.10.1—	UM Statute Does Not Provide For Insured’s Recovery Of Attorney Fees From UM/UIM Carrier	146
§ 2.10.2—	Prejudgment Interest On Award Of Damages In UIM Case Is Limited To Interest On Difference Between Damages Awarded And Amount Insured Recovers From Tortfeasor	148
§ 2.10.3—	Liability Of Insurer For Prejudgment Interest In Excess Of Policy Limits	149
§ 2.11	UIM COVERAGE — PURSUIT AND EXHAUSTION OF CLAIMS AGAINST UNDERINSURED DRIVER AS PREREQUISITE TO COVERAGE	151
§ 2.11.1—	Exhaustion Of Tortfeasor’s Liability Limits Not A Prerequisite To UIM Claim	151
§ 2.11.2—	Pursuit Of Claim Against Tortfeasor Is Prerequisite To Recovery Of UIM Benefits	152
§ 2.12	INSURED’S RIGHT OF ACTION AGAINST INSURER FOR BREACH OF DUTY TO OFFER UM/UIM COVERAGE AND/OR COVERAGE WITH HIGHER LIMITS THAN LIMITS OF LIABILITY COVERAGE — REFORMATION OF POLICY	153
§ 2.12.1—	Insurer Has Duty To Advise Insureds Of Nature And Purpose Of UM/UIM Coverage And To Offer Insureds The Opportunity To Purchase UM/UIM Coverage In An Amount Equal To Bodily Injury Liability Limits, And Insured Has Right Of Action Against Insurer For Breach Of This Duty	153

Table of Contents

§ 2.12.2—For Accidents Occurring Before 1995, Rental Car Company Had Statutory Duty Under C.R.S. § 10-4-609(1) To Offer Lessees Of Its Vehicles The Opportunity To Purchase UM/UIM Coverage 158

§ 2.12.3—RTD, As Holder Of Certificate Of Self-Insurance, Is Not Required By C.R.S. § 10-4-609(1) To Provide UM/UIM Coverage To Passengers In Its Vehicles 161

§ 2.12.4—“Step-Down” Endorsement In UM/UIM Coverage Was Unenforceable Because In Including It In The Policy, Insurer Violated C.R.S. § 10-4-609(2) . . . 161

§ 2.12.5—Insurer And Agent Satisfied Statutory And Common Law Obligations By Offering Insured Opportunity To Purchase UM/UIM Coverage With Limits Of \$100,000/\$300,000 163

§ 2.12.6—Even Where Insured Purchases Liability Coverage With Minimum Limits, Insurer Has One-Time Duty To Offer Insurer Opportunity To Purchase UM/UIM Coverage With Higher Limits 165

§ 2.12.7—An Umbrella Policy Is Not An Automobile Liability Policy Or A Motor Vehicle Liability Policy. Therefore, An Insurer Has No Duty To Offer An Insured The Opportunity To Purchase UM/UIM Coverage When It Issues An Umbrella Policy 167

§ 2.12.8—UM/UIM Litigation Based Upon Insurers’ Alleged Failure To Advise Insureds Of The Effect Of *DeHerrera v. Sentry Insurance Co.*, 30 P.3d 167 (Colo. 2001) 169

§ 2.13 COMPLIANCE WITH POLICY NOTICE REQUIREMENTS 174

§ 2.13.1—Policy Provision Requiring Insured To Give Notice Of Hit-And-Run Accident Is Enforceable As Condition Precedent To Coverage 174

§ 2.13.2—Insured’s Duty To Give Insurer Notice Of Possible UIM Claim Arises When Insured, With Reasonable Diligence, Can Ascertain That Alleged Tortfeasor Is Underinsured 175

a—Alleged delay of 15 months did not bar claim . . . 175

b—In UIM cases, insurer bears burden of proving prejudice to deny claim based upon insured’s failure to give timely notice 176

§ 2.13.3—The “Notice-Prejudice Rule” Applies To A
 Consent-To-Settle Clause In UIM Coverage.
 However, There Is A Rebuttable Presumption
 Of Prejudice If An Insured Breaches A
 Consent-To-Settle Clause 179

§ 2.14 PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES 180

§ 2.14.1—Policy Provision Allowing Insurer To Reduce
 UM Benefits By Amount Paid To Insured As
 Workers’ Compensation Benefits Is Contrary
 To Public Policy 180

§ 2.14.2—“Other Insurance” Clause, Under Which Excess
 Insurer Is Obligated To Pay UM Benefits Only
 To The Extent That The Limits Of Liability
 Exceed Those Of Primary Insurer, Is Not
 Contrary To Public Policy 181

§ 2.14.3—Policy Provision In Uninsured Motorist Policy
 Allowing Insurer To Reduce UM Benefits On
 A Dollar-For-Dollar Basis By Amount Of PIP
 Benefits Paid Is Contrary To Public Policy —
 Proper Procedure To Avoid Double Recovery
 Of PIP Benefits 183

§ 2.14.4—Subrogation Clause And Release-Trust
 Agreement Are Contrary To Public Policy And
 Cannot Be Enforced, To The Extent That
 Enforcement Of Such Agreements Impairs
 Insured’s Right To Full Compensation For
 Loss Caused By Uninsured Motorist 185

§ 2.14.5—“Owned But Uninsured” Exclusion Applicable
 To Resident Relative Of Named Insured Does
 Not Violate Public Policy 187

§ 2.14.6—Insurer’s Application Of Household Exclusion
 To Deny Uninsured Motorist Coverage Does
 Not Contravene Public Policy 189

§ 2.14.7—Policy Provision Allowing Insurer To Offset
 Social Security Disability Benefits Received
 By Insured From Insured’s UM/UIM Coverage
 Is Void As Contrary To Public Policy 191

§ 2.14.8—Under C.R.S. § 10-4-609, Insurers Must Offer
 UM/UIM Coverage To Class Of Persons At
 Least As Extensive As Class Covered Under
 Liability Provisions Of Policy 193

Table of Contents

§ 2.14.9—Policy Provision Allowing Insurer To Aggregate Policy Limits Of All Available Liability Insurance Policies For Purposes Of Determining Whether Insurer Is Liable For Payment Of UIM Benefits Is Not Contrary To Public Policy	196
§ 2.14.10—Policy Provision Allowing Insurer To Seek A Trial De Novo After An Unfavorable Arbitration Award Is Void And Unenforceable As Contrary To Public Policy	198
§ 2.14.11—“Consent-To-Settle” Clause In UIM Coverage Does Not Violate Public Policy	200
§ 2.14.12—Exclusion Of UM/UIM Coverage For Injury Arising Out Of Use Of Owned But Uninsured Or Non-Owned Vehicle Furnished Or Available For Regular Use Of Insured Or Family Member Does Not Violate Public Policy	201
§ 2.14.13—In A UM/UIM Policy, An “Owned But Uninsured” Exclusion Is Void As Contrary To Public Policy . . .	203
§ 2.14.14—Neither Express Terms Of Automobile Insurance Contract Nor Public Policy Considerations Imposed A Duty Upon Insurer To Pay Insured’s Attorney Fees In Dispute Over Uninsured Motorist Benefits	205
§ 2.14.15—Auto Insurer Was Not Required To Provide PIP Or UM Coverage To Insured Motorists Injured In An Accident In Mexico	207
§ 2.14.16—Provision In Uninsured Motorist Policy Requiring Independent Corroborating Witness To Support Claim In Case Of Hit-And-Run Phantom Vehicle Is Void As Contrary To Public Policy	209
§ 2.14.17—Insurer Was Entitled To Reduction In Arbitration Award For UIM Benefits For Amount It Previously Paid For Medical Expenses. Setoff Was Allowed Because Insured’s UIM Benefits Were Not Impaired And To Prevent Insured From Obtaining Double Recovery	210
§ 2.15 DETERMINATION OF AMOUNT OF UIM COVERAGE	212
§ 2.15.1—Where More Than One Person Is Injured, Per Accident Limit Of Tortfeasor’s Policy Is Used To Determine Whether UIM Coverage Is Available	212

§ 2.15.2—Conflict Between “Limit Of Liability” Language And “Other Insurance” Language In UM/UIM Coverage Creates An Ambiguity That Will Be Construed In Favor Of Insured	214
§ 2.15.3—Insurer May Aggregate Liability Payments To Multiple Insureds Injured In A Single Accident In Determining Amount Of Available UIM Benefits Under Per Accident Limit Of Policy	216
§ 2.15.4—Vehicle Is “Underinsured” If Payments “To Persons Other Than An Insured” Reduce Liability Coverage Below Limits Of UIM Coverage — “Other Insurance” Clause May Render Policy Ambiguous, Increasing Insurer’s Potential Liability For Payment Of UIM Benefits	218
§ 2.15.5—Under C.R.S. § 10-4-609(5), To Determine Liability For UIM Benefits, Insurer May Offset Only Amounts Actually Paid By Tortfeasor’s Liability Carrier, Not Amounts Payable Under The Policy	220
§ 2.15.6—Amount Of Available UM/UIM Benefits Is Not Multiplied By Number Of Motorists Who Cause Or Contribute To A Single Accident	221
§ 2.15.7—Insurer May Not Reduce Available UIM Coverage By Amount Of Liability Payments To Persons Other Than An Insured	224
§ 2.15.8—Where Multiple UM/UIM Policies Exist, Insurer May Be Entitled To Entire Offset For Liability Payment To Insured, If Other Policies Make No Claim To The Offset	227
§ 2.15.9—Where Multiple UM/UIM Policies Exist, Primary Insurer May Be Entitled To Claim Entire Offset	229
§ 2.15.10—Workers’ Compensation Carrier Does Not Have A Right Of Subrogation Against A UM/UIM Insurer	231
§ 2.16 CONFLICT OF LAWS	232
§ 2.16.1—In The Absence Of An Effective Choice Of Law Provision In The Insurance Contract, The Most Significant Relationship Test Applies To Determine Which State’s Law Governs	232

Table of Contents

§ 2.17 STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS APPLICABLE TO UM/UIM CLAIMS 234

§ 2.17.1—Two-Year And Three-Year Limitations Periods In Statute Of Limitations For Uninsured Motorist Claims, C.R.S. § 13-80-107.5(1)(a), Run Concurrently, Not Consecutively 235

§ 2.17.2—Insured Has Minimum Of Three Years In Which To Commence An Action To Recover UM Benefits 238

§ 2.17.3—Running Of Statute Of Limitations On Insured’s Claim For UM Benefits Was Not Tolled Until Insured Consulted Attorney. Insurer Owed No Duty To Inform Insured Regarding Statute Of Limitations 239

§ 2.17.4—Where A Policy Includes A Consensual Arbitration Clause, A Demand For Arbitration Made Within The Time Period Prescribed By The Statute Of Limitations, C.R.S. § 13-80-107.5, Does Not Satisfy The Statute 241

Chapter 3 AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY CLAIMS AND LIABILITY INSURANCE 245

§ 3.1 INTRODUCTION 254

§ 3.2 NO-FAULT THRESHOLD REQUIREMENT (REPEALED) 256

§ 3.2.1—Commencement Of Action Where Threshold Requirement Not Yet Satisfied 256

§ 3.2.2—Proof Required To Establish Threshold Requirement 257

a—Testimony of plaintiff may be sufficient 257

b—Burden of proof regarding threshold rests with plaintiff — Testimony of plaintiff as to amount of bills incurred may not be sufficient, if plaintiff presents no evidence that medical services were reasonably needed 258

c—Fact that PIP carrier pays expenses does not establish that they were related to accident — Whether threshold requirement has been met is usually fact question for jury 259

§ 3.2.3—Proof Of Threshold Does Not Necessarily Entitle Plaintiff To Recover Damages	261
§ 3.2.4—Exemption From Threshold Requirement For Intentional Torts Under C.R.S. § 10-4-715	263
§ 3.2.5—Threshold Requirement Is Applicable To A Claim For Loss Of Consortium	264
§ 3.3 NO RIGHT TO RECOVERY OF AMOUNTS PAID OR PAYABLE AS PIP BENEFITS (REPEALED)	266
§ 3.3.1—General Rule Precludes Recovery Of PIP Benefits . . .	266
§ 3.3.2—PIP Benefits Improperly Awarded As Damages By Jury Are Subject To Reduction By Court	267
§ 3.3.3—Adoption Of C.R.S. § 13-21-111.6 Did Not Overturn No-Fault Act’s Prohibition Of Recovery Of PIP Benefits In Tort Action	268
§ 3.4 ISSUES RELATING TO LIABILITY AND DAMAGES IN LITIGATION OF MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT CLAIMS	269
§ 3.4.1—The “Seat Belt Defense”	269
a—Defendant entitled to jury instruction on seat belt defense even if no evidence of relationship between failure to use and injuries	269
b—If vehicle is equipped with separate lap and shoulder seat belts, plaintiff must use both to avoid application of the “seat belt defense” — Evidence of failure to wear seat belt may be used to mitigate plaintiff’s non-economic damages, but not as a basis for comparative negligence	270
c—Mitigation of damages provision in seatbelt defense statute, C.R.S. § 42-4-237(7), encompasses all categories of non-economic damages, not just damages for pain and suffering, but does not include damages for physical impairment and disfigurement	273
§ 3.4.2—Parental Immunity Doctrine Not Abrogated By No-Fault Act	276

Table of Contents

§ 3.4.3—Negligence And Comparative Negligence 278

- a—Plaintiff allowed to recover where plaintiff’s negligence is less than combined negligence of defendants or combined negligence of defendants and designated non-parties 278
- b—Presumption of negligence in rear-end collision —
When directed verdict is appropriate 280
- c—Pro rata liability statute, C.R.S. § 13-21-111.5, requires apportionment of fault between negligent and intentional conduct that combine to cause the same injury 281
- d—Comparative negligence statute does not preclude state from recovering payments made under Colorado Medical Assistance Act 283
- e—Repair shop has no duty to warn customer about danger of broken seat belt, where customer knows belt is broken and should know of potential hazard 285
- f—Ordinance requiring animal owners to keep them on premises did not impose strict liability upon owner when horse escaped from property and caused collision with plaintiff’s vehicle 286
- g—In a wrongful death action arising from a motor vehicle accident, plaintiff may recover as long as decedent’s negligence is less than the combined negligence of all tortfeasors, including named defendant’s and designated non-parties’, but if defendant is liable for wrongful death, solatium award is not subject to reduction by percentage of decedent’s negligence 288
- h—While violation of a traffic ordinance constitutes negligence per se, a conviction for a traffic violation is not admissible in a civil action to prove that the defendant was negligent per se 291
- i—A driver is under a duty to drive with reasonable care, which may, in some circumstances, be violated by failing to pull over to the shoulder of the road 293

- j—Giving of sudden emergency instruction to jury was proper based upon the defendant’s testimony alone, without corroborating testimony from other witnesses. The fact that a stationary vehicle is struck by another vehicle does not give rise to a presumption of negligence 295
- k—Where plaintiff was injured when her vehicle collided with a horse, plaintiff was not entitled to a negligence per se instruction based upon defendant’s alleged violation of a municipal ordinance precluding the owner of an animal from permitting it to run at large 297
- l—Negligence per se jury instruction based upon a careless driving ordinance was unnecessarily cumulative, but the trial court did not err in giving the instruction 298
- § 3.4.4—Workers’ Compensation Insurer’s Subrogation Rights Do Not Extend To Injured Worker’s Recovery Of Non-Economic Damages Or Spouse’s Recovery For Loss Of Consortium 299
- § 3.4.5—Negligent Entrustment Of Vehicles 303
 - a—Supplying funds to a minor child who has a history of drug and alcohol abuse, so child can purchase a vehicle, may give rise to a claim of negligent entrustment 303
 - b—Person who entrusts vehicle to another, who injures himself when driving while intoxicated, may be liable to injured driver under doctrine of negligent entrustment — Statutes that limit liability of commercial vendors of alcohol and social hosts, C.R.S. §§ 12-46-112.5 and 12-47-128.5 (1991), do not apply to entrusting a vehicle to an intoxicated person 304
 - c—Parents who co-sign loan to facilitate child’s purchase of vehicle are not liable for negligent entrustment because supplying credit is not furnishing a chattel 307
 - d—Seller of vehicle has no duty to determine whether potential buyer has liability insurance 309
- § 3.4.6—The Family Car Doctrine 310
 - a—Elements of a claim under the family car doctrine 310

Table of Contents

b—Family car doctrine does not apply where adult child is living outside parent’s household and is self-supporting	312
§ 3.4.7—Adequacy Of Damages	313
a—Trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant new trial to plaintiff in low-impact rear-end collision case, where jury awarded damages for physical impairment, but no damages for non-economic loss or economic loss	313
§ 3.4.8—Evidence Of A Plaintiff’s Status As An Unauthorized Immigrant To The United States May Be Relevant And Admissible To Limit A Claim For Damages For Lost Wages	314
§ 3.4.9—A Spouse’s Loss Of Consortium Claim Is A Derivative But Separate Claim, And An Agreement To Settle The Injured Spouse’s Claim Does Not Necessarily Bar The Other Spouse’s Loss Of Consortium Claim. A Negligent Infliction Of Emotional Distress Claim Is An Independent, Not A Derivative, Claim, And An Agreement Settling The Injured Spouse’s Bodily Injury Claim Does Not Necessarily Bar The Other Spouse’s Claim For Negligent Infliction Of Emotional Distress	316
§ 3.4.10—Absent An Agreement To Do So Or A Special Relationship With The Driver, Passengers In A Vehicle Have No Duty To Keep A Look Out And Give Warning Or Intervene To Prevent An Accident	319
§ 3.5 DISCOVERY AND EVIDENTIARY ISSUES IN MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT CASES	321
§ 3.5.1—Admissibility Of Expert Witness Testimony	321
a—Properly qualified neuropsychologist may offer opinion testimony regarding the presence or absence of organic brain injury	321
b—Admissibility of expert testimony regarding low-speed impact testing on human volunteers	322
c—Evidence of QEEG not admissible to show minor brain injury, but evidence of video fluoroscopy may be admitted to show torn ligament	324

§ 3.5.2—Evidence Of Liability Insurance Generally Inadmissible, But May Be Admitted To Show Bias Of A Defense Expert If There Is A “Substantial Connection” Between Defense Expert And Defendant’s Insurer	327
§ 3.5.3—Evidence Of Party’s Receipt Of Traffic Citation Or Conviction Of Traffic Offense Is Generally Inadmissible Under C.R.S. § 42-4-1713	328
§ 3.5.4—Evidence Of A Motorcyclist’s Failure To Wear Helmet Is Inadmissible To Show Negligence — Lack Of Driver’s License Generally Inadmissible To Show Operator’s Negligence	330
§ 3.5.5—Expert Witness Who Switches Sides During Litigation May Be Disqualified	332
§ 3.5.6—Discovery Of A Plaintiff’s Medical, Psychological, Or Tax Records	333
a—Discovery of a plaintiff’s psychiatric or psychological records	333
b—Discovery of plaintiff’s medical records	335
c—Discovery of plaintiff’s medical records — Privileged documents log required; discovery of tax returns	338
§ 3.5.7—Defendant’s Medical Records Are Generally Not Discoverable	341
§ 3.5.8—Specific Evidence Of Future Economic Loss Is Not Necessary To Support A Substantial Award Of Damages For A Minor Child	342
§ 3.5.9—Evidence Of Defendant’s Conduct After An Accident May Be Admissible To Support Claim For Punitive Damages	343
§ 3.5.10—Liability Insurer’s Reserves And Settlement Authority Are Not Subject To Discovery	345
§ 3.5.11—In Automobile Negligence Action, Trial Court Improperly Admitted Into Evidence A Decision Of An Administrative Law Judge In A Social Security Administration Hearing And A Depression Inventory Prepared By A Doctor Who Did Not Testify At Trial — Erroneous Admission Of Hearsay Evidence Was Not Harmless Error And Warranted New Trial	347

Table of Contents

**§ 3.6 STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS GOVERNING
MOTOR VEHICLE LIABILITY CLAIMS 349**

§ 3.6.1—Three-Year Statute Of Limitations For Bodily
Injury Claims Arising Out Of The Use Or
Operation Of A Motor Vehicle Begins To Run
When Both Injury And Its Cause Are Known
Or Should Have Been Known 350

§ 3.6.2—Statute Of Limitations Applicable To Claim
Against Law Enforcement Officers 353

§ 3.6.3—Subrogation Claims Are Subject To Three-Year,
Not Two-Year, Statute Of Limitations 354

§ 3.6.4—Where Plaintiff Is Injured While Using Or
Operating A Motor Vehicle, Three-Year Statute
Of Limitations Applies, Even If Tortfeasor’s
Conduct Does Not Involve The Use Or
Operation Of A Motor Vehicle 355

**§ 3.7 PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS —
PERMISSIBLE AND IMPERMISSIBLE POLICY
EXCLUSIONS IN MOTOR VEHICLE
LIABILITY POLICIES 357**

§ 3.7.1—The “Household Exclusion” 357

a—Household exclusions declared to be
invalid in 1984 358

b—Enactment of C.R.S. § 10-4-418(2)(b) in 1986
created new public policy that household
exclusions are not contrary to public policy 360

§ 3.7.2—Provision In Rental Car Contract, Negating
Collision Damage Waiver Where Renter Is DUI,
Is Unconscionable 362

§ 3.7.3—The “Named Driver” Exclusion Is Valid
And Enforceable 364

§ 3.7.4—Exclusion For Persons Moving Property To
And From Covered Vehicle Is Void As Contrary
To Public Policy 366

§ 3.7.5—Permissive User Exclusion Is Valid 368

§ 3.7.6—Named Insured Exclusion Is Void As Contrary To Public Policy 369

 a—Exclusion of liability coverage for bodily injury to insureds who are not members of same household is invalid as contrary to the No-Fault Act 369

 b—Enactment of C.R.S. § 10-4-418(2)(b) did not legitimize named insured exclusions 371

§ 3.7.7—Exclusion That Limits Liability Coverage For Permissive Drivers To Those Who Have No Insurance Of Their Own Is Void As Contrary To Public Policy 373

§ 3.7.8—Exclusion Of Coverage For Operation Of Non-Owned Vehicle Without The Consent Of The Owner Does Not Violate The No-Fault Act 375

§ 3.7.9—Business Use Delivery Exclusion In Personal Auto Liability Policy Is Void As Against Public Policy 376

§ 3.7.10—Criminal Acts Exclusion In Excess Liability Insurance Policy Was Not Contrary To Public Policy, Nor Did The Exclusion Violate The Reasonable Expectations Of The Insured 377

§ 3.7.11—“Regular Use” Exclusion In Auto Liability Policy Is Consistent With Public Policy And Operated To Exclude Coverage Where The Tortfeasor Was Driving His Father’s Vehicle And His Father Was A Named Insured Under The Policy. Moreover, A Vehicle Merely Used As A Temporary, Gratuitous Substitute For An Insured Vehicle Does Not Constitute A “Replacement” Vehicle 382

§ 3.8 LIABILITY COVERAGE FOR PERMISSIVE USERS 384

§ 3.8.1—Purchaser Of Vehicle, Who Has Taken Possession From Named Insured, Is Not A Permissive User Entitled To Liability Coverage Under Named Insured’s Policy 385

§ 3.8.2—Adoption Of The “Initial Permission Rule” 386

§ 3.8.3—Implied Permission To Use A Vehicle Exists As Long As The Permittee Does Not Know Of The Denial Of Actual Permission From The Owner 389

Table of Contents

§ 3.8.4—Conditional Vendee Of Vehicle Was Operating Vehicle As A Permissive User, Not As An Owner, At The Time Of Fatal Accident, Since Oral Sale Agreement Provided That Titleholder Would Continue To Insure Vehicle Until It Was Paid For, Thereby Evidencing An Intent That Immediate Right Of Possession Of Vehicle Had Not Been Transferred To Conditional Vendee 391

§ 3.9 OBLIGATION OF INSURER TO PAY PREJUDGMENT INTEREST 393

§ 3.9.1—Under “Additional Payments Clause,” Insurer Is Not Obligated To Pay Prejudgment Interest In Excess Of Policy Limit 393

§ 3.9.2—The No-Fault Act, C.R.S. § 10-4-706(1), Does Not Impose An Obligation Upon Insurers To Pay Prejudgment Interest In Excess Of The Liability Policy Limit 395

§ 3.10 STACKING OF LIABILITY COVERAGE 397

§ 3.10.1—Unambiguous Anti-Stacking Provisions Will Be Enforced 397

§ 3.11 WHEN DOES AN ACCIDENT OR INJURY ARISE OUT OF THE OPERATION, MAINTENANCE, OR USE OF A MOTOR VEHICLE? 399

§ 3.11.1—Injury Or Death Does Not Arise Out Of The Use Of A Motor Vehicle Where The Vehicle Is Merely The Situs Of A Shooting 399

§ 3.11.2—Accidental Shooting, Which Occurs While Vehicle Is Being Used As A Platform For Hunting, Does Not Arise Out Of The Use Of A Vehicle 400

§ 3.11.3—Loading And Unloading Of A Vehicle — “Complete Operation” Doctrine Applies In Colorado — “But For” Test Of Causation Applies . . . 401

§ 3.11.4—Injury Does Not Arise Out Of Use Of Vehicle When Victim Is Struck By Falling Object While Victim Is Sitting In Vehicle 403

§ 3.11.5—Gunshot Injury That Occurred During Loading Of Vehicle Is Covered By Liability Policy If Injury Would Not Have Occurred “But For” The Loading 404

§ 3.11.6—Where One Vehicle Is Towing Another, Driver Of Towing Vehicle Is “Using” Both Vehicles For Purposes Of Liability Coverage 405

§ 3.11.7—Accidental Discharge Of Firearm By Hunter In A Vehicle May Arise From “Use” Of Vehicle If Use Of Vehicle Is Related To The Discharge Of The Firearm And It Is More Than Merely Fortuitous That The Accident Occurred In The Vehicle 407

§ 3.12 PRIMACY OF LIABILITY COVERAGES — APPORTIONMENT OF COVERAGE WHERE EXCESS CLAUSES CONFLICT 409

§ 3.12.1—Conflicting Excess Clauses In Liability Policies Are Void As Mutually Repugnant — Owner’s Policy Not Required By The No-Fault Act To Provide Primary Coverage 409

§ 3.12.2—The No-Fault Act Imposes No Rules Regarding Primacy Of Liability Coverage — Where Policies Contain Mutually Repugnant Excess Clauses, Liability Is Apportioned On An Equal Basis Up To The Limits Of Each Policy 412

§ 3.12.3—Although General Rule Is That Two Conflicting Excess Clauses Cancel Each Other Out, Rule Is Not Applied When One Excess Clause Appears In A Primary Policy And The Other Appears In A Policy Designed As An Excess Or Umbrella Policy 414

§ 3.12.4—Unambiguous Excess Clause Will Be Given Effect 416

§ 3.12.5—Excess Liability Insurer That Pays More Than Its Share Of Defense Costs For Its Insured May Obtain Contribution Of Defense Costs And Settlement Payment From Primary Insurer 418

§ 3.12.6—Provision In Rental Contract Making Rental Company’s Liability Insurance Excess Over Other Collectible Insurance Is Not Contrary To Public Policy Under The No-Fault Act 420

Table of Contents

§ 3.13	INSURED’S DUTIES — COMPLIANCE WITH POLICY NOTICE REQUIREMENTS	422
§ 3.13.1	—Traditional Rule — Insurer Did Not Have To Show Prejudice To Deny Coverage Based Upon Insured’s Unexcused Failure To Provide Notice	422
a	—Insured’s unexcused delay in giving notice of accident or in forwarding suit papers relieves liability insurer of its duties under policy, regardless of whether insurer suffers prejudice	422
b	—Seven-month delay in forwarding suit papers to liability insurer relieved insurer of duty to defend and indemnify	424
§ 3.13.2	—Notice-Prejudice Rule Applies To Liability Insurance Coverage	425
§ 3.13.3	—Notice Provisions In A Liability Policy May Be Set Aside Where Substantial Justification Exists	426
§ 3.13.4	—Where Duty To Provide Notice Of Accident Falls Only On Named Insured, Named Insured’s Failure To Provide Timely Notice Does Not Relieve Insurer Of Obligation To Defend And Indemnify Additional Insured	428
§ 3.14	INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR NEGLIGENT ENTRUSTMENT CLAIMS	430
§ 3.14.1	—Under Policy Provision Excluding Coverage For Bodily Injury Arising Out Of Use, Ownership, Maintenance, Or Operation Of A Motor Vehicle, No Coverage Exists For A Claim Of Negligent Entrustment Of The Vehicle	430
§ 3.14.2	—Coverage May Not Exist For Negligent Entrustment Claim Under An Automobile Liability Unless Persons Entrusting The Vehicle Are Named Insureds Under The Policy	432
§ 3.14.3	—Damages For Wrongful Death Resulting From Accident That Occurred When Teenage Boy Who Was Riding A Go-Cart Was Struck By A Pickup Were Excluded From Coverage Under A Homeowner’s Policy	433

§ 3.15	DUTY OF SELF-INSURERS	435
§ 3.15.1	C.R.S. § 10-4-716(1) Does Not Limit Obligation Of Self-Insurers To Provide Liability Coverage For Permissive Users Of Vehicles	435
§ 3.16	WHO IS AN “INSURED” FOR PURPOSES OF LIABILITY COVERAGE — COVERAGE FOR NON-OWNED VEHICLES AND RESIDENTS OF INSURED’S HOUSEHOLD AND EXCLUSIONS FROM COVERAGE	436
§ 3.16.1	Employee Exclusions Generally	437
§ 3.16.2	Employee Exclusions Are Enforceable And Are Not Contrary To The Public Policy Of The No-Fault Act	437
§ 3.16.3	Named Driver Exclusion	438
a	Named driver exclusion operates to negate coverage for claim of negligent entrustment	439
§ 3.16.4	Coverage For Newly Acquired Automobiles	440
a	Coverage for newly acquired automobiles extends only to vehicle acquired by the “named insured”	440
b	Where insured fails to give notice to insurer of purchase of newly acquired auto within time prescribed by policy, insurer may properly deny liability coverage	441
§ 3.16.5	Liability Coverage For Resident Relatives Of The Named Insured	443
§ 3.16.6	Coverage For “Non-Owned” Automobiles	444
a	Vehicle titled in business name of insured’s sole proprietorship was not a “non-owned auto” for purposes of insured’s personal automobile policy	444
b	Where policy contains no definition of term “non-owned automobile,” term is construed according to its plain, ordinary, and customary meaning	445
c	For purposes of a “non-owned automobile” exclusion, the term “resident of same household” includes girlfriend who lives with boyfriend at time of accident	446

Table of Contents

§ 3.16.7—Exclusion Of Coverage For Non-Owned Vehicle Furnished Or Available For Regular Use	447
a—Unambiguous exclusion will be enforced	447
b—Purpose of “regular use” exclusion	448
§ 3.16.8—Coverage For A Temporary, Substitute Vehicle Does Not Extend To A Vehicle Owned By The Insured . . .	450
§ 3.17 DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTIONS	451
§ 3.17.1—Where Insurer Unsuccessfully Brings Declaratory Judgment Action Against Insured, Language Of Liability Policy May Require Insurer To Pay Insured’s Attorney Fees In Defense Of Such Action	451
§ 3.17.2—Anticipatory Declaratory Judgment Actions In Colorado	452
a—Declaratory judgment actions in Colorado	452
b—Basic requirements for a declaratory judgment action — Standing and a justiciable controversy	453
c—What is an anticipatory declaratory judgment action?	455
d—How confusion entered the law	455
e—What the court held in <i>Hecla</i>	457
f—Clarification in <i>Constitution Associates</i>	460
g—Further clarification in <i>Herring</i>	465
h—Conclusion	466
§ 3.18 COVERAGE LIMITS	466
§ 3.18.1—In Wrongful Death Claim, Per-Person Liability Limit Applies To Decedent, And Parents Asserting Claim Are Not Entitled To Recover Separate, Per-Person Limit	466

§ 3.19 MISREPRESENTATION BY INSURED — EFFECT ON COVERAGE 468

§ 3.19.1—Determining Materiality Of Misrepresentation 470

 a—Insured’s misrepresentation regarding ownership of one of 12 vehicles covered under a commercial auto policy was not material as to liability coverage because the insured was covered for purposes of liability coverage regardless of ownership 470

§ 3.20 MISCELLANEOUS 472

§ 3.20.1—Since Loss Of Consortium Is A Personal Injury, Not A Bodily Injury, Coverage For Loss Of Consortium Is Combined Within The Single “Each Person” Limit For Bodily Injury 472

§ 3.20.2—Garage Liability Coverage 473

 a—Repair of insured’s rental truck at garage location is incidental to garage business and falls within garage operations liability coverage 473

Chapter 4 LITIGATION OF MOTOR VEHICLE LIABILITY CLAIMS UNDER COLORADO’S TORT SYSTEM 477

§ 4.1 INTRODUCTION 477

§ 4.2 THE ELIMINATION OF THE THRESHOLD REQUIREMENT 482

§ 4.3 DAMAGES RECOVERABLE UNDER THE TORT SYSTEM 486

§ 4.4 SUBROGATION CLAIMS AND LIENS 488

 § 4.4.1—Subrogation Under The Former No-Fault Act 488

 § 4.4.2—Subrogation Under Current Law 489

 § 4.4.3—Hospital Liens 492

 § 4.4.4—Medicaid Liens 494

 § 4.4.5—Medicare Claims 496

 § 4.4.6—Workers’ Compensation Subrogation Claims 497

Table of Contents

§ 4.5 APPLICATION OF THE COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE	500
<hr/>	
APPENDIX A	505
<hr/>	
APPENDIX B	527
<hr/>	
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES	713
<hr/>	
SUBJECT INDEX	733
<hr/>	

